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Abstract 
This paper reports on research into the negative relationship between 
inflation and the markup.  It is argued that this relationship can be 
thought of as ‘long-run’ in nature which suggests that inflation has a 
persistent effect on the markup and, therefore, the real wage.  A ‘rule of 
thumb’ from the estimates indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in 
inflation (as occurred worldwide in the 1970s) is associated with around 
a 7 per cent fall in the markup accompanied by a similar increase in the 
real wage.  It is argued that movements of this magnitude in the markup 
and the real wage will have important implications for a range of 
economic outcomes such as unemployment, employment and investment. 
 
Keywords:  Inflation, Wages, Prices, Markup, Monetary Policy, Competition. 
JEL Classification:  C22, C32, C52, E24, E31 
 
9 August 2006 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
*  Department of Economic Studies, University of Dundee, Dundee, DD1 4HN, United Kingdom.  
Email: brussell@brolga.net. Tel. 01382 384443.  Fax. 01382 384691.  I would like to thank participants of 
seminars at the Bank of England, Lancaster Business School and the Reserve Bank of Australia for helpful and 
insightful comments. 
  
1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last half of the 1980s while working in the Research Department of the Reserve Bank 
of Australia I observed that for the major western economies, the markup of price on unit 
labour costs was high when inflation was low and visa versa.1  The markup can be thought of 
as the profit share of national income or an aggregate measure of the profitability of firms.  
Importantly, the shifts in the markup associated with changes in the general rate of inflation 
seem to persist even after 10 or 15 years of high and relatively stable inflation. 
This observation presents a puzzle for standard macroeconomics as persistently high inflation 
should not be associated with a persistent shift in a ‘real’ variable such as the markup.  
Instead standard macroeconomics predicts that the relationship between inflation and the 
markup should be fleeting and the markup should quickly return to some long-run level.  
Consequently, the markup should bear no relation to the rate of inflation in the long-run given 
enough time and inflation is stable. 
The puzzle is not the negative inflation-markup relationship itself as this has been identified 
either directly or indirectly in a number of empirical papers.2  The puzzle is how persistent the 
impact of inflation on the markup is.  In other words, if the rate of inflation is either stable 
and high (as in the 1970s and early 1980s), or stable and low (as since the mid-1990s), 
standard macroeconomics would predict that the markup should return to the same long-run 
value.  It is easy to show empirically that this has not been the case.  Persistent shifts in the 
rate of inflation are associated with persistent shifts in the level of the markup and that the 
relationship appears ‘permanent’ in some sense even after long periods of time. 
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If the latter condition is not satisfied then the relationship between prices and costs cannot be termed the 
markup.  At an aggregate level where the only inputs are labour and capital, one measure of the markup 
is: ( ) ( )lwypmu +−+=  where y , w , and l , are constant price output, the average wage rate and 
the level of employment respectively.  The markup in this case is equivalent to the inverse of labour’s 
share of national income. 
2  For example see Richards and Stevens (1987), Bénabou (1992), Franz and Gordon (1993), Cockerell and 
Russell (1995), de Brouwer and Ericsson (1998), and Batini, Jackson, and Nickell (2000) and inter alia. 
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The persistence of shifts in the markup and the ‘permanence’ of the inflation-markup 
relationship are demonstrated in a series of mainly empirical papers with my principle co-
author Professor Banerjee (European University Institute and the University of Oxford).  We 
identify a negative long-run relationship between inflation and the markup using data for the 
United States, United Kingdom, Canada, West Germany, France, Italy, Australia and the Euro 
area.3  The relationship can be identified from the early 1950s to the beginning of the 21st 
Century using industry or economy wide data. 
Is it important that the markup and inflation are negatively related?  The answer is 
straightforward and yes.  Persistent shifts in inflation that lead to persistent shifts in the 
markup are likely to affect a range of important economic outcomes.  For example, a ‘rule-of-
thumb’ from the empirical estimates so far is that a 10 percentage point increase in the 
general rate of inflation (as occurred in many developed economies in the 1970s) is associated 
with around a 7 percent increase in the real wage relative to the level of productivity.  
Movements in the real wage of this magnitude are likely to severely reduce employment and 
increase unemployment.  Furthermore, the associated reduction in the profit share is likely to 
lead to falls in investment and the subsequent reduction in the capital stock will lower 
productivity and standards of living.  These effects on the economy are all the more important 
because they would persist for as long as the high inflation persists. 
The remainder of this paper considers four issues that the research focuses on; namely, 
(i) inflation is non-stationary; (ii) estimating the negative inflation-markup relationship; 
(iii) explaining the relationship; and (iv) some policy implications of the relationship. 
2 INFLATION IS NON-STATIONARY 
There are very, very few statements that we can be confident about in macroeconomics but 
one must be the long-run rate of inflation has not been constant over the past 50 years.  That 
is, inflation is not a stationary variable with a constant mean.  Leaving aside evidence from 
unit root tests that are notoriously unreliable, the statement logically follows by considering 
the implications if the converse of this statement is true.4  That is, if inflation is stationary 
                                                                                                                                                        
3  The long-run is in the sense of Engle and Granger (1987).  For the estimates see Banerjee, Cockerell and 
Russell (2001), and Banerjee and Russell (2001a, 2001b, 2004, 2005). 
4  Unit root tests are well known to have low power and in the hands of a ‘skilled’ practitioner can find 
inflation to be either a stationary or a non-stationary process. 
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with a constant mean then there is a unique long-run rate of inflation and this would imply 
that: 
(i) The question ‘what is the long-run rate of inflation?’ is valid.  Furthermore, the answer 
must be invariant to whether you are standing in 1950, 1974, 1989, 1995 or 2005 and if 
you are looking forward or backward.  The usual method of estimating the long-run rate 
of inflation is to simply measure the average rate of inflation over the sample under 
consideration.  For the period 1950-2004, UK RPI (all items) annual inflation had a 
mean of around 6 per cent compared with a rate of around 2 ½ per cent for the last ten 
years (see graph 1).  If there was a constant long-run rate of inflation then this suggests 
that there should be considerable upward pressure on inflation at the moment.  
Furthermore, it implies that the Bank’s inflation target is inconsistent with this measure 
of the long-run rate of inflation.  The usual response to this argument is to say there are 
‘breaks’ in the inflation series in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.  This response simply 
acknowledges that there has been a shift in the mean rate of inflation i.e. the long-run 
rate of inflation is not constant. 
Graph 1 
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(ii) Institutional arrangements have no impact on the long-run rate of inflation.  For 
example, the targeting of inflation, money or exchange rates, the level of independence 
of the central bank, or the personalities of the governors of the central bank (i.e. Volker, 
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Greenspan, or Bernanke) will have no effect on the constant long-run rate of inflation.  
Instead, these issues can only influence how fast inflation returns to the long-run rate of 
inflation and not the rate itself.  Furthermore, it implies that making the Bank of 
England independent with an inflation target has in no way helped to maintain annual 
inflation at around 2 ½ per cent over the last 10 years compared with an average rate of 
9 per cent for the 25 years before that. 
(iii) All the monetary economics and macroeconomics literature describing the dynamics 
associated with changes in the long-run rate of money growth would be at best 
‘misplaced’ as only one growth rate of money will be consistent with the long-run rate 
of inflation. 
(iv) The long-run Phillips curve in an applied sense is a single point as there is only one rate 
of inflation in the long-run.  There is also only one short-run Phillips curve as there is 
only one long-run rate of inflation.  Furthermore, any theoretical discussion of the 
dynamics that an economy will display during the transition between different rates of 
inflation in the long run is meaningless as the economy never experiences any change in 
the long-run rate of inflation. 
Unless we are willing to accept what is implied by a constant long-run rate of inflation, we 
must conclude that inflation does not have a constant mean.  In other words, inflation is non-
stationary. 
3 ESTIMATING THE NEGATIVE INFLATION-MARKUP RELATIONSHIP 
There are two broad ways to model non-stationary inflation.  The first is to assume inflation is 
stationary with shifting means.  The usual way to proceed here is to include a shift dummy 
that coincides with periods when it is thought that the mean rate of inflation has shifted.  The 
problem with this approach is that the inflation series will be ‘rendered’ stationary with the 
inclusion of just a few dummies due to the well documented low power of unit root tests.  
These ‘few’ dummies will not represent all the shifts in mean inflation over the sample and 
they will be hard to interpret in an economic sense. 
The second way to proceed is to assume that inflation behaves as if it is an integrated 
variable.  This cannot be strictly true as inflation in most economies appears to be bounded 
above at some positive rate and below at, or near, zero.  However, this approach has two 
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major advantages.  First, it allows us to investigate directly the long-run relationship between 
inflation and the markup.  And second, as the number of breaks in the mean rate of inflation 
increase, the stationary with shifting means model converges on the integrated model.  So 
while the ‘true’ statistical behaviour of inflation is most likely stationary with a very frequent 
and unknown shifting mean, our estimation of the relationship proceeds assuming that 
inflation is an integrated variable of order 1. 
In any case, estimates of the relationship derived from models that assume inflation is 
stationary with shifting means are very similar in magnitude, and the same in an economic 
and policy sense, as those derived from models that assume inflation is an integrated variable.  
In other words, it is not important how you proceed in estimating the negative inflation-
markup relationship.  What is important is that you model inflation as a non-stationary 
statistical process and that you interpret the estimated relationship as between the markup and 
different mean rates of inflation. 
3.1 The General Inflation-Markup Model 
Given the assumption that inflation is an integrated variable of order 1, the long-run structure 
of our general model is given by: 5 
 ( ) pqpmulcpmu ∆−=−−−= λφφ 1  (1) 
where, ulc  is unit labour costs, pm  is the price per unit of imports, q  is the ‘gross’ markup, 
and mu  is the markup ‘net’ of the cost of inflation.6  Lower case variables are in natural 
logarithms.  The inflation cost coefficient λ  is greater than zero and 10 ≤≤φ .  The 
coefficients φ  and φ−1  are the long-run price elasticities with respect to unit labour costs and 
import prices respectively.  Long-run homogeneity is imposed with these coefficients 
summing to one.7  That is, for a given rate of inflation, an increase in either unit labour costs 
                                                                                                                                                        
5  The form of the long-run price equation is a dynamic generalisation of that estimated in de Brouwer and 
Ericsson (1998).  See Banerjee, Cockerell and Russell (2001) for the derivation of (1) from a standard 
Layard/Nickell imperfect competition model. 
6  The assumption of a linear relationship between inflation and the markup in (1) cannot strictly be true since 
the markup approaches zero as inflation tends to an infinite rate.  However, we assume that over the smaller 
range of values of inflation considered by us, the log linear relationship is a good approximation. 
7  Note that without linear homogeneity q  does not represent the ‘gross’ markup of prices on costs. 
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or import prices will see prices fully adjust in the long-run to leave the markup unchanged.8 
Equation (1) collapses to the standard imperfect competition markup model of prices when 
0=λ .  In our more general case when 0≠λ , inflation imposes costs on firms and the markup 
net of the cost of inflation is reduced. 
Assuming that inflation is I(1) implies that prices, unit labour costs and import prices are all 
I(2) variables and so system estimates of (1) is somewhat tricky.  Banerjee, Cockerell and 
Russell (2001) and Banerjee and Russell (2001a) estimate the model using I(2) methods 
developed by Johansen (1995a, b).9  We find in these papers that the I(2) levels of prices and 
costs cointegrate to the markup which is I(1) and then there is a negative cointegrating (or 
long-run) relationship between the markup and inflation (both of which are I(1)). 
An alternative way to proceed is to test for and then impose linear homogeneity on (1).  In 
this case we can write the markup defined in (1) as the weighted sum of the markup of price 
on unit labour costs, muulc , and the ‘real exchange rate’, rer .  When the markup is 
calculated in this way using a measure of consumer prices, we write (1) as:  
 pqrermuulcmu ∆−=+= λδ  (2) 
where ulcpmuulc −=  and pmprer −= .10 The estimated markup written in the form of 
(1) with linear homogeneity imposed is then:  
 pmulcpmu ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−−+−= φφ 1
11
1
1  (3) 
The advantage of (3) is that it can be estimated using familiar I(1) system methods. 
Estimation of the system is conditioned on two predetermined (stationary) variables.  The first 
are a number of spike intervention dummies to capture the sometimes erratic short-run wage 
and price behaviour of firms and labour.   This is especially the case during the OPEC oil 
                                                                                                                                                        
8  When the general level of inflation increases we will observe in the data that increases in costs are not fully 
reflected in higher prices.  This necessarily follows as the markup falls with higher inflation and this can 
only come about if increases in unit labour costs are not fully passed though into higher prices.  
Consequently, linear homogeneity is evident in the data only when there is no change in the long-run rate of 
inflation. 
9  See also Haldrup (1998) and Paruolo (1996). 
10  The term rer  may be referred to as the ‘real exchange rate’ due to the similarity to the relative price of 
traded and non-traded goods used by Swan (1963) as a measure of the real exchange rate. 
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price shocks and large shifts in exchange rates and tax regimes. The second is the log change 
in the unemployment rate to represent the business cycle in the model. 
An alternative specification of the empirical model would be to include the level of 
unemployment in the cointegrating space as an endogenous or exogenous variable.  However, 
it is not clear what the economic relationship between the markup, inflation and the level of 
unemployment would be in the long-run.  There is some indication that the relationship is 
highly non-linear and may differ substantially among economies.  Furthermore, such an 
inclusion would alter the interpretation of this variable from that of an indicator of the 
business cycle to one of an excess supply of labour.  It was therefore decided to allow for the 
effects of the business cycle by conditioning on a stationary pre-determined variable given by 
the log change in the unemployment rate and its lags. 
3.2 Estimates of the Long-run Inflation-Markup Relationship 
With Anindya Banerjee (and others) we identify the negative long-run relationship using the 
data for the G7 economies (excluding Japan) and Australia.11  Estimates of the long-run 
inflation-markup relationship from these papers are summarised in Table 1.12  The right hand 
column reports the estimates of the inflation cost coefficient, λ , and shows considerable 
similarity across countries and data sets.  The long-run relationship is remarkably robust to 
levels of aggregation (industry versus economy wide data), data frequency (quarterly versus 
annual data) and time periods.  The estimates suggest ‘a rule of thumb’ where an increase of 
one percentage point in the long-run rate of annual inflation will be associated with a fall in 
the markup of around 0.7 of one percent. 
The United Kingdom results from Banerjee and Russell (2001a) are shown graphically in 
Graph 1. These results are typical of those reported in Table 1.  The solid line, LR, in the 
graph represents the estimated long-run relationship using quarterly United Kingdom data for 
the period December 1961 to March 1997.  The actual observations of inflation and the 
markup are also shown on the graph.  Note that the slope of the graph is about – 0.6 (i.e. a 10 
percentage point increase in inflation is associated with about a 6 per cent fall in the markup) 
                                                                                                                                                        
11  Banerjee, Cockerell and Russell (2001), Banerjee and Russell (2001a, 2001b, 2004, 2005), Russell and 
Banerjee (2006) and Banerjee, Mizen and Russell (2006). 
12  For comparison, Table 2 provides implied estimates of the long-run relationship that can be derived from 
estimated inflation equations that assume inflation is a stationary variable. 
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and this is equal to the long-run inflation coefficient reported in the last column of Table 1 for 
the United Kingdom. 
One explanation of the negative long-run relationship in the data is that the 1970s were a 
period when supply shocks from the energy and labour markets were very prevalent.  The low 
markup, therefore, simply reflects the lags in price adjustment following the shocks. The 
adjustment appears to be very slow for economies with little or no price controls.  The 
relatively low markup persists for around 10 years following the shocks and the markup does 
not fully recover until the economy experiences low inflation again (i.e. there is a reduction in 
the mean rate of inflation). 
Another explanation of the negative relationship is that the business cycle has a positive 
relationship with inflation and a negative relationship with the markup.  Consequently, the 
negative inflation-markup relationship is simply due to the simultaneous influence of the 
business cycle on both variables. 
In response to these two explanations of the negative inflation-markup relationship the 
realisations of the markup and inflation for five distinct inflationary periods are indicated by 
different symbols in Graph 1.   If the ‘supply shocks’ and ‘business cycle’ arguments are 
correct then different mean levels of inflation would not affect the behaviour of the markup.  
Consequently, realisations of the markup and inflation from different periods of inflation 
would be distributed evenly along the entire curve in Graph 1. This however is not the case. 
It may be seen clearly from the graph that if the data were subdivided into periods of inflation 
with different means, the associated mean levels of the markup are different. For example, the 
early 1960s are shown as crosses on Graph 1 and we see that the markup is high during a 
period of low inflation.  The late 1960s and early 1970s are shown as squares and was a 
period of slightly higher inflation and a slightly lower markup.  We can follow the 
relationship through each inflationary period until the observations return to hover around 
low inflation and a high markup for the period following the early 1990s recession. 
The ability to separate actual observations of inflation and the markup into distinct periods 
with higher inflation associated with a lower markup and vice versa, is further confirmation 
that inflation is a non-stationary process. 
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The crucial issue, and result, of this research is that inflation has a persistent impact on a real 
variable which in our case is the markup.  It is a moot point whether the ‘persistence’ 
represents a ‘long-run’ relationship in the sense used by economic theorists (i.e. the value that 
the markup would converge to after an infinite period of time with constant inflation and 
other non-markup real variables at their long-run values).  However, we can say that the 
‘persistence’ does satisfy the standard tests of a ‘long-run’ relationship in the sense used by 
econometricians (i.e. in the Engle and Granger 1987 sense).  Furthermore, from the point of 
view of macro-policy, the persistence represents a long enough period of time for it to be 
important. 
Finally, it is acknowledged that the 1970s data plays an important role in allowing the long-
run relationship to be identified.  If the inflation and markup data are stationary with a 
constant mean then no long-run relationship can be identified in the data even if the variables 
are related when the data is non-stationary. From this perspective, the 1970s provides the 
data so that inflation is a non-stationary process and the relationship can be investigated in a 
meaningful way. 
4 EXPLAINING THE NEGATIVE INFLATION-MARKUP RELATIONSHIP 
There is an extensive literature on the inflation-markup relationship that is written within the 
framework that either explicitly or implicitly assumes that inflation is a stationary variable.13  
Consequently, the literature does not consider the impact on the markup of a ‘permanent’ 
change in the mean rate of inflation.  Furthermore, these models either explicitly or implicitly 
assume ‘money neutrality’ and so inflation cannot have a permanent impact on a real variable 
(i.e. the markup) in the long-run. 
In contrast, Russell, Evans, and Preston (2002), Chen and Russell (2002) and Russell (1998) 
provide explicit explanations of the long-run relationship. The first paper argues that due to 
missing information, firms do not know the profit maximising price and markup.  Firms also 
believe for a number of reasons that they face an asymmetric loss function such that setting a 
‘high’ markup (and price) relative to the profit maximising values costs the firm more than 
setting a ‘low’ markup. 
                                                                                                                                                        
13  In the Mankiw (1985) and Parkin (1986) menu cost tradition see Rotemberg (1983), Kuran (1986), Naish 
(1986), Danziger (1988), Konieczny (1990) and Bénabou and Konieczny (1994).  Alternatively see Athey, 
Bagwell and Sanichiro (1998) for an indirect explanation or Bénabou (1988, 1992) and Diamond (1993). 
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The asymmetry may be due to a number of reasons.  First, firms may trade in a customer 
market.14  In this case the impact on the firm of setting a ‘high’ markup (i.e. a high price) 
cannot simply be reversed by setting the profit maximising markup in the following period.  
Having set a ‘high’ markup, some customers search for relatively lower prices associated with 
a low markup which, if found, they will accept.  The lost customer cannot be induced back to 
the old supplier by a reduction in the old supplier’s markup because the impetus to search is 
now triggered by the new supplier and not the old supplier.  Without the new supplier 
inducing further search by raising their markup, the lost customer will not search and find that 
the prices offered by their old supplier have fallen.  A ‘high’ markup, therefore, may have a 
long term and large impact on the number of customers while a ‘low’ markup has little 
impact.  A second reason is that firms may believe they face a ‘kinked’ demand curve.15  
Setting a high markup, therefore, will have a larger impact on output and profits than setting a 
‘low’ markup.  A third reason is that firms may face increasing returns to scale.  In this case, 
the impact of a ‘high’ markup on output reduces profits by more than the impact of a ‘low’ 
markup on output.16 
Consequently, if firms believe they face an asymmetric loss function then, in an uncertain 
economic environment, firms will set a ‘low’ markup (and price) relative to their profit 
maximising values to avoid the disproportionately bad outcome of mistakenly setting a ‘high’ 
markup (and price).  Finally, if uncertainty increases with inflation then firms will set a lower 
markup with higher inflation. 
The remaining two papers focus on the difficulties that firms face when attempting to 
coordinate price changes in an inflationary environment.17  Chen and Russell (2002) argue 
that disequilibrium from the profit maximising markup imposes two forms of costs on the 
firm. First there are the lost profits when in disequilibrium.  Second there is the expected cost 
                                                                                                                                                        
14 For customer markets see Okun (1981) in particular, but also McDonald and Spindler (1987), Bils (1989), 
McDonald (1990). 
15 For ‘kinked’ demand curves see Sweezy (1939), Hall and Hitch (1939), Stigler (1947, 1978), Maskin and 
Tirole (1988). 
16 A further interpretation of the asymmetric loss function is that it simply reflects risk averse firms. 
17  Not withstanding the many possible coordination failures that firms may experience, these two paper only 
considers the non-synchronous change in prices in response to generalised cost and price inflation. A 
number of authors highlight the inability of firms to coordinate price changes.  For example, see Ball and 
Romer (1991), Eckstein and Fromm (1968), Blinder (1990) and Chatterjee and Cooper (1989). 
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of poor price coordination between firms as prices adjust back to the profit maximising 
markup.  It is argued that firms in an uncertain economic environment will choose the speed 
of price adjustment that minimises the expected loss while in disequilibrium.  The expected 
loss is the sum of the lost profits in disequilibrium and the expected cost of coordination 
failure. 
The speed of price adjustment impacts on the expected loss in two ways.  The faster the speed 
of adjustment the lower the adjustment cost in terms of lost profits.  However, the faster the 
speed of adjustment the greater the probability of coordination failure between firms as they 
adjust prices.  Therefore, a firm that is optimally choosing the speed of adjustment will 
increase the speed of adjustment until the marginal benefit to the firm in terms of lower 
adjustment costs just balances the marginal cost due to the increase in the expected cost of 
coordination failure.  As might be expected, the speed of adjustment increases with the size of 
the disequilibrium from the desired markup and falls with the cost of coordination failure.  An 
important result is that unless the probability of coordination failure is insensitive to the speed 
of price adjustment then firms will adopt a ‘gradualist’ approach to price adjustment when in 
disequilibrium.18 Consequently, the model in this paper displays nominal price inertia.  If the 
firm operates in an inflationary environment then one can imagine an ‘equilibrium’ between 
the firms adjusting prices back to the profit maximising markup and the repeated negative 
shocks to the markup due to the inflationary environment. 
The model in this paper predicts that higher inflation leads to a lower markup unless the 
expected cost of coordination failure is insensitive to the speed of price adjustment.  Higher 
inflation increases the cost of adjustment in terms of lost profits during disequilibrium and the 
firm responds by increasing the speed of price adjustment.  However, while the increase in 
the speed of adjustment reduces the loss in profits it simultaneously increases the probability 
of coordination failure.  Consequently the speed of adjustment does not increase by enough to 
maintain the level of the markup and the markup falls with higher inflation.  The lower 
markup with higher inflation can be interpreted as the higher cost to firms of overcoming the 
missing information that may cause the coordination failure.  Importantly, it is argued that 
                                                                                                                                                        
18  The assumption that underpins the ‘gradualist’ price adjustment is similar to the assumption of speed-
dependent adjustment costs in the investment literature following Eisner and Strotz (1963) that leads to 
partial, or ‘gradualist’, adjustment behaviour by firms except that in this case the adjustment costs are the 
expected costs of adjustment. 
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this relationship will persist in the steady state as the missing information is not of a type that 
can be overcome by knowing the average rate of aggregate inflation.19  
The second paper that focuses on the difficulties that firms face when coordinating price 
changes is Russell (1998).  This paper considers what happens if non-colluding price setting 
firms follow a ‘price rule’ so as to overcome missing information concerning how to 
coordinate price changes with competitors.20  The firm’s objective with the price rule is to 
avoid the cost of price coordination failure due to non-synchronous price adjustment in an 
inflationary environment.  The price rule conforms to two assumptions concerning the pricing 
behaviour of firms for given trading conditions.  The first is, the lower the markup the greater 
the increase in prices set by firms.  The second is, firms do not instantly and fully increase 
prices in response to an increase in unit costs. That is, an increase in unit costs leads initially 
to a fall in the markup. 
The paper proceeds to show how the price rule leads firms in an inflationary environment to 
synchronise their price increases before considering the steady state properties of the price 
rule.  The model suggests that higher inflation is associated with a lower markup in the steady 
state. However, the relationship is non-linear. At zero steady state inflation, the markup is at a 
maximum and, as inflation increases, the markup declines and converges on some minimum 
value.  The declining markup as inflation increases in the steady state is interpreted as the cost 
to firms of overcoming the missing information when trying to coordinate changes in prices. 
While the cost of avoiding price coordination failure increases with inflation, it does so at a 
declining rate. 
An important question is whether these papers describe a relationship between the markup 
and inflation that will persist in the steady state.  The relationship will only persist if the 
uncertainty due to the missing information also persists in the steady state.  If the uncertainty 
is due to firms not knowing the average rate of inflation then uncertainty will disappear in the 
steady state and any short-run relationship between inflation and the markup will also 
disappear.  In a price-taking model with perfectly competitive firms, this may well be a good 
characterisation of the uncertainty faced by firms.  To maximise profits, firms simply need to 
accurately predict the price level so that they can set the profit maximising level of output. 
                                                                                                                                                        
19  The steady state is defined as all nominal variables growing at the same constant rate. 
20 The rules are formal, or following Machlup (1946), the ‘feel’ of the businessman. 
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However, for price-setting firms this may be a poor characterisation of uncertainty.  
Uncertainty may be more than just not knowing the average rate of inflation.  For price-
setting firms, the uncertainty may be due to the difficulty in coordinating price changes in an 
inflationary environment and the profit maximising price is unknown.  This difficulty may 
persist even when firms are aware of the average rate of inflation and, therefore, the 
relationship between inflation and the markup may also persist in the steady state.  
Furthermore, price-setting firms must respond to higher inflation by changing prices more 
often, by larger amounts in real terms, or by some combination of these responses.  These 
responses are likely to increase the difficulty of coordinating price changes.  Therefore, 
uncertainty is likely to increase with inflation as the firm’s difficulty in coordinating price 
changes also increases. 
Finally, these three papers argue explicitly that there is a negative relationship between the 
markup and steady state rates of inflation that may be thought of as a long-run relationship.  
The lower markup associated with higher inflation in these papers is interpreted as the cost to 
firms of overcoming the missing information when setting prices in an inflationary economic 
environment. 
5 POLICY AMD OTHER ISSUES 
5.1 Real Wage Shocks and the Implications for Monetary Policy 
Given the price setting nature of the explanations of the negative relationship between 
inflation and the markup it follows that we consider the implications from the perspective of a 
Layard / Nickell macroeconomic model where firms set prices and bargain with labour over 
wages.21 
The negative long-run relationship between inflation and the markup implies there is a 
positive relationship between inflation and the real wage relative to productivity.  This 
suggests there is a role for the monetary authorities in the interaction between employed 
labour and firms in the wage outcome for the following reason. 
Consider an economy that is in the long-run equilibrium at A in Figure 1 where monetary 
policy is consistent with a long-run rate of inflation Ap∆  and the curve LR  represents the 
                                                                                                                                                        
21  See Layard and Nickell (1991) and Carlin and Soskice (1990). 
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long-run relationship between inflation and the markup.  If the economy experiences a push 
by employed labour for higher real wages relative to productivity then in the short-run the 
economy may move to a position such as B where inflation is higher and the markup is lower 
due to lags in price adjustment.22  We can now consider the impact of the monetary 
authorities on inflation and the markup. 
If the monetary authorities do not loosen policy and monetary policy remains consistent with 
Ap∆  then the economy will eventually return to A.  One adjustment mechanism that might 
occur is in the labour market where the higher real wages and real interest rates leads to an 
increase in unemployment that causes real wages to fall and the markup recovers to its pre-
shock level.23  Another adjustment mechanism, it that price setting firms will eventually pass 
through the labour cost increases to achieve their desired markup for the given rate of long-
run inflation, Ap∆ . 
Alternatively the monetary authorities may respond to the real wage shock and the associated 
increase in unemployment by loosening monetary policy to Cp∆ .  In this case the economy 
converges on C where the markup is lower but the real wage and inflation are higher.  The 
third alternative is that the monetary authorities partially loosen policy in response to the 
shock and the economy converges on some intermediate long-run equilibrium such as D. 
If we assume that the welfare of employed labour includes real wages and unemployment 
then it follows that the only time consistent (or credible) monetary policy is one where policy 
is not loosened following the shock to real wages.  In this case the welfare of the employed 
has unambiguously not increased as the real wage is unchanged in the new long-run following 
the wage shock and unemployment is either higher or unchanged.  If policy is loosened 
following the shock then employed labour is rewarded by a higher real wage in the new long-
run providing an incentive for further real wage shocks in the future. 
We may also consider what motivates employed labour to push for higher real wages relative 
to productivity.  If employed labour pushes for higher real wages then they must do so with 
                                                                                                                                                        
22  A similar analysis can be undertaken in response to a positive oil price, import price, tax or general cost 
shock. 
23  This assumes no change in the level of productivity between the initial and final long-run equilibrium.  If 
the lower level of employment increases the marginal product of labour then at A productivity in the new 
long-run may be higher along with the real wage and unemployment.  However, the relationship between 
the markup and inflation will be unchanged. 
  15
the expectation that the monetary authorities will respond by at least partially loosening 
monetary policy so that real wages remain higher in the new long-run equilibrium.  
Presumably this expectation is based on the past behaviour of the monetary authorities in 
response to previous wage shocks.  Therefore, the only time consistent monetary policy that 
avoids creating the incentive for further real wage shocks is one where the monetary 
authorities do not loosen policy following a shock to real wages. 
This argument can be contrasted with Friedman (1968) where money growth (or inflation) 
rules for monetary policy are justified on the grounds that the short-run costs of adjustment 
back to the long-run are reduced.  The implications of the inflation-markup model is that an 
inflation target will reduce the costs associated with changes to the long-run rate of 
inflation.24  Friedman (1968) also argues that it is stability in the rate of money growth that is 
important and not the level of money growth or the level of inflation.  A further contrast, 
therefore, is that the inflation-markup model suggests that a low inflation target is preferable 
to a high inflation target if a high profit share is preferable to a low profit share. 
The desirability of a low inflation target does not imply that there is no role for counter-
cyclical macroeconomic policies following aggregate demand shocks.  For example, a 
reduction in aggregate demand will lead to lower inflation allowing some room to loosen 
macroeconomic policy. 
5.2 Competition and the Long-run Relationship 
One might argue that the long-run relationships in Graph 1 will be steeper the higher the level 
of competition.  In a perfectly competitive (price taking) world there is no relationship 
between inflation and the markup and the markup is dependent on ‘real’ factors alone.  In this 
case the long-run curve in Graph 1 would be vertical and 0=λ  in equation (1).  One might 
conclude that the steeper the LR  curve the closer the economy approximates perfect 
competition. 
There is some difficulty, however, in making the argument too simple.  While competition is 
a nebulous concept it is often argued that competition increases with the number of firms in 
an industry.  The implication is that the economy better approximates the perfectly 
competitive case as the number of firms increase.  A further implication is that there is a 
                                                                                                                                                        
24  These arguments are treated in more detail in Russell (1996), Russell et al. (2002) and Chen and Russell 
(2002). 
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continuous spectrum of competitive states based on the number of firms from a monopoly 
with one firm to perfect competition with a large number of firms.  However, this ignores the 
complications introduced by considering price setting rather than price taking firms.  It also 
ignores the underlying source of the long-run relationship proposed in the papers outlined in 
Section 4 which is the uncertainty due to missing information and the threat of failing to 
coordinate price changes in a price setting world. 
By assuming that an increase in the number of firms leads to a closer approximation to perfect 
competition in a price setting world with uncertainty and missing information one must also 
assume that more firms not only reduces market power but simultaneously reduces 
uncertainty and missing information.  While the former is likely to lead to a reduction in the 
level of the markup, the latter does not necessarily follow with price setting firms.  It is more 
likely that an increase in the number of firms leads to an increase in uncertainty because it is 
more difficult to coordinate price changes.  More firms and greater competition, therefore, 
leads to an increase in uncertainty and a flatter (and not steeper) long-run curve in Graph 1. 
It follows, therefore, that a reduction in the number of price setting firms increases the slope 
of the long-run curve until in the limit the economy is made up of only monopolies and the 
uncertainty concerning coordinating price changes disappears (assuming no other source of 
price uncertainty).  Consequently the long-run curve is vertical.  This is the opposite 
conclusion to that when firms are perfectly competitive when more firms lead to a vertical 
long-run curve. 
This apparent contradiction can be resolved by recognising that the amount and type of 
competition affects both the level of the markup and the slope of the long-run curve as 
demonstrated in Figure 2. The two limiting cases are shown in the diagram.  The first is 
labelled PCLR  and represents perfect competition where the long-run curve is vertical and 
0=λ .  With price-taking firms, increasing the number of firms implies an increase in the 
level of competition and this rotates the long-run curve, LR , in a clockwise direction while 
simultaneously lowering the mean value of the long-run markup for a given range of inflation. 
The second limiting case is for a monopoly. The theories outlined in Section 4 that can 
explain the long-run curve imply that inflation has no impact on the markup of a monopoly in 
the long-run as there is no opportunity for price coordination failure between firms.25  In this 
                                                                                                                                                        
25  This assumes that there is no other source of inflation related price uncertainty for a monopoly. 
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case the inflation cost coefficient is also 0=λ  and the long-run curve is vertical (labelled 
MLR  in Figure 2) and the long-run markup is greater than in the perfectly competitive case. 
In the case of a monopoly, an increase in the number of firms and in the level of competition 
would see a reduction in the slope of the long-run curve as the long-run curve rotates in an 
anticlockwise direction and the mean value of the curve for a given range of inflation falls.  If 
at some point firms behave as price-takers, increasing the number of firms and competition 
will no longer reduce the slope of the long-run curve and the slope will increase as the long-
run curve rotates in a clockwise fashion.  However, the mean value of the markup will 
continue to fall with increasing competition. 
This discussion suggests two things.  First, the size of the inflation coefficient depends in part 
on industry structure.  Second, as one moves through the spectrum of competition from 
monopoly to perfect competition, at some point the relationship between competition and the 
inflation coefficient reverses and this point will depend on the technology and nature of the 
industry itself. Consequently there is no monotonic relationship between the number of firms 
or measures of competition and the inflation coefficient. 
5.3 Independent Central Banks and Inflation Targeting 
The inflation-markup relationship suggests that there are benefits that accrue to those who 
control the setting of monetary policy.  For example, governments that represent employed 
labour will desire higher inflation as it lowers the markup so that the real wage of the workers 
increase relative to productivity. In contrast, governments representing firms will desire lower 
inflation so as to increase the profit share.  In many ways the present world-wide move 
towards inflation targeting and central bank independence can be seen as an institutional 
framework designed to reduce the volatility in the setting of monetary policy (in terms of 
shifts in the implicit target rate of inflation) that is introduced when the economic group that 
controls the central bank (i.e. the government) changes. 
The slope of the long-run relationship also has a number of implications for the monetary 
policy framework.  First, the flatter the long-run curve the greater the perceived benefits for 
the monetary authorities of targeting low inflation.  This is because the flatter the long-run 
curve the greater the impact on the markup of a change in inflation and so the greater the 
benefits in terms of higher investment and employment.  Second, the flatter the long-run 
curve the more important it is for the monetary authorities to be independent of the political 
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process.  This is because the returns to employed labour and firms of influencing monetary 
policy are higher with a flatter long-run curve.  Consequently to avoid large shifts in 
monetary policy the monetary authorities need to be independent of employed labour and 
firms. 
5.4 The Capital Markets 
If capital markets are imperfect then the markup may influence investment and the size of the 
capital stock due to the impact of the markup on the availability of internal funds.26  Higher 
inflation lowers the markup and reduces the ability of firms to fund investment through 
internal funds leading to a lower capital stock in the long-run.27  This implies that the growth 
path of the capital stock is lower with higher inflation and presumably the growth path in 
output per capita is also lower.  However, the rate of growth in output per capita is unaffected 
in the long run as it is determined by the rate of technical progress only that it is on a lower 
growth path.  
6 CONCLUSION 
In summary the contribution of this research programme to our general understanding is 
twofold.  First, until this research, the literature ignores how persistent the impact of inflation 
is on the markup.  Instead standard economics downplays the importance of the relationship 
because it is thought the impact is only fleeting.  Consequently, the important implications for 
the economy of a persistent decrease or increase in the markup during long periods of high or 
low inflation are ignored in the literature so far.  Second, the research programme provides an 
important avenue for understanding how monetary policy should be set and how the 
institutional framework for the setting of monetary policy has developed. 
                                                                                                                                                        
26 Fazzari et al. (1988) argue the cost to firms of internal funds is less than external funds and shows 
empirically that investment is influenced by the availability of internal finance. 
27 Pindyck and Solimano (1993) offer three explanations why internal funds may influence investment.  They 
also show for a number of countries that investment is negatively correlated with inflation. 
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Figure 1:  Real Wage Shocks and Monetary Policy 
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Figure 2: Competition and the Long-Run Relationship 
 
 
 
  
Table 1: Estimates of the negative long-run inflation-markup relationship assuming inflation is integrated of order 1 
The long-run relationship is written tt pqmu ∆−= λ  where tmu  is the estimated markup of price on unit costs ‘net’ of the costs of inflation, tp∆  represents inflation, 
q  is the ‘gross’ markup, and λ  is a positive parameter and is termed the ‘inflation cost’ coefficient.  Lower case variables are in natural logs.  The inflation cost coefficient 
is equivalent to the decrease in the markup associated with a 1 percentage point increase in the annual rate of inflation. 
Paper Country Data(1) Frequency Inflation Coefficient, λ (2) 
Banerjee, Cockerell & Russell (2001) Australia March 1972 to June 1995, EWD. Q I(1) model:  1.8 
I(2) model:  1.8 
Banerjee & Russell (2001a) United States December 1961 to June 1997, EWD. Q I(1) model:  0.5 
I(2) model:  0.3 
 Germany March 1971 to December 1994, EWD. Q I(1) model:  1.2 
I(2) model:  0.9 
 France December 1971 to March 1997, EWD. Q I(1) model:  0.7 
I(2) model:  0.7 
 Italy March 1972 to March 1997, EWD. Q I(1) model:  2.0 
I(2) model:  2.0 
 United Kingdom December 1961 to March 1997, EWD. Q I(1) model:  0.6 
I(2) model:  0.6 
 Canada March 1962 to March 1997, EWD. Q I(1) model:  1.1 
I(2) model:  1.1 
 Australia March 1967 to March 1997, EWD. Q I(1) model:  1.3 
I(2) model:  1.4 
Banerjee & Russell (2001b) United States 1947 to 1997.  Private industry data.  Results of 
industry data are for ‘market based’ industries where 
inflation is I(1).   
A Total private industry: 0.6 
Industry results: 1.1, 0.7, 2.8, 2.0, 
1.4, 4.6, 5.2, 1.4, and 1.0. 
Banerjee & Russell (2004) United States December 1952 to March 1989. Private sector data 
(i.e. excluding government). 
Q I(1) model:  0.8 
Banerjee & Russell (2005) United States June 1953 to March 2000.  Private sector data (i.e. 
excluding government). 
Q I(1) unit cost markup model:  0.6 
I(1) marginal cost markup model: 1.7 
Russell & Banerjee (2006) Euro Area June 1973 to March 2002, EWD. Q I(1) model:  1.2 
Banerjee, Mizen & Russell (2002) United States June 1968 to June 2001, private sector data. Q I(1) model:  1.6 
 United States 1950 to 1997, private sector data. A I(1) model:  1.5 
 United Kingdom June 1964 to March 2001, EWD. Q I(1) model:  1.1 
 United Kingdom 1951 to 1999, EWD. A I(1) model:  0.4 
(1) EWD is economy wide data.  (2) Estimates of λ  using quarterly data are multiplied by 0.25 to give the implicit annual value of λ .  The I(1) model estimates the long-
run equation directly using the markup and inflation.  The I(2) model assumes that prices and costs are I(2) variables and freely estimates the markup and λ  simultaneously. 
  2 
Table 2: Implicit estimates of the negative long-run inflation-markup relationship from previously published work 
Paper Country Data and Notes on Estimation(1) Implicit 
Inflation 
Coefficient, 
λ  
Franz and 
Gordon (1993) 
United 
States 
Quarterly data, June 1962 to December 1990, EWD.  The paper estimates error correction models of inflation where the 
ECM is equivalent to the markup.  From table 7 we see the short-run impact of the ECM (markup) on inflation is – 0.07.  
We can solve for the implicit long run relationship by assuming inflation is constant such that:  
ECMECMp 31.0
78.01
07.0 −=−
−=∆  where p∆  is inflation and ECM  is the error correction term.  Inverting the 
estimated equation and dividing by 4 (to give the annual inflation cost coefficient), the implicit 79.0=λ .  This can be 
compared with the United States results from Table 1 above of 0.3, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 0.6, 1.5 and 1.6. 
0.8 
 Germany Quarterly data, June 1962 to December 1990, EWD.  Calculating the long-run inflation cost coefficient in the same was as 
above for the United States then 08.0=λ .  This can be compared with the German result from Table 1 above of 0.9 and 
1.2. 
0.1 
Cockerell & 
Russell (1995) 
Australia Quarterly data, June 1972 to September 1973, EWD.  The paper estimates simultaneously error correction models for wage 
and price inflation where the error correction term is equivalent to the markup.  The paper solves for the steady state 
relationship between inflation and the markup and reports on page 23 that a 1 percentage point increase in annual steady 
state inflation leads to a fall in the markup of 1 1/3 per cent.  The implicit inflation cost coefficient is therefore 75.0=λ .  
This can be compared with the Australian results from Table 1 above of 1.3, 1.4, and 1.8. 
0.8 
de Brouwer & 
Ericsson (1998) 
Australia Quarterly data, June 1972 to September 1973, EWD.  An implicit inflation cost coefficient, 8.2=λ , can be calculated 
from the results reported in equation (10) on paper 438 by setting petrol price inflation equal to price inflation in the long 
run. This can again be compared with the Australian results from Table 1 above of 1.3, 1.4, and 1.8. 
2.8 
Batini, Jackson 
& Nickell 
(2000) 
United 
Kingdom 
September 1972 to June 1999, EWD.   The estimation is in terms of the natural logarithm of labour’s income share which is 
equivalent to minus the natural logarithm of the markup.  Taking the ‘baseline’ results of Table 7a (page 32) we see the 
short-run impact of labour’s income share on inflation is 0.16.  In the long run with inflation is a constant rate we can solve 
the estimated equation such that:  *51.0*
69.01
16.0 ssp =−=∆  where p∆  is inflation and *s  is labour’s income 
share.  Inverting the estimated equation, taking the negative (to get the relationship with the markup) and dividing by 4 (to 
give the annual inflation cost coefficient), the implicit 5.0=λ .  This can be compared with the United Kingdom results 
from Table 1 above of 0.4, 0.6 and 1.1. 
0.5 
(1) EWD is economy wide data 
